The economic crisis began with the housing crisis, and it will only end when the housing crisis also ends. Unfortunately, the evidence of the past five years suggests that the Obama administration and Congress have never actually understood this connection. Despite massive numbers of foreclosures, the loss of almost $7 trillion in housing wealth (over one-half the nation’s home equity), and even unprecedented pleas from the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, there has been a shocking paucity of innovation or even policy activity in the housing arena.

Now there is a a very real chance that Congress will destroy the limited policies the Obama administration does have in place, prevent additional efforts, and further widen the gap between the haves and have-nots in America. Moreover, the net effect of this congressional failure could be to further undermine the weak housing market and risk sending the nation into another economic tailspin.

The administration’s signature housing policy effort is now aimed at mortgage principal reductions. This effort is at the core of the multi-state robo-mortgage settlement and central to the administration’s criticism of Edward DeMarco, the acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. From the perspective of many analysts, myself included, the administration is finally on the right track, but its efforts are far too minimal to make a meaningful difference. Indeed, the nation’s total negative equity (the amount of mortgage debt owed which exceeds the value of the underlying properties) is presently in the range of $700 billion, and it’s likely to increase.

Nonetheless, the administration’s principal reduction efforts are a step in the right direction. These efforts open the door for the far larger, far more creative efforts that will ultimately be needed to prevent millions of upcoming foreclosures and possibly massive walk-aways from the estimated 23 percent (and increasing) of all mortgage holders — 11 million families — who are underwater.

Here’s the issue: As a general rule, any debt forgiveness is income. This means that if a home buyer borrows to buy a house and the bank forgives a portion of the loan, whether in a short sale, through debt reduction (i.e. the settlement), or even foreclosure in states that allow banks to officially choose not to seek recourse, a taxable event has occurred. The income earned is the difference between the original mortgage borrowed and the amount ultimately repaid to the bank.

For example: A family borrows $300,000 for a mortgage. The home declines in value and the bank agrees to a short sale (where the sale price is for less than the amount of the homeowner’s mortgage debt) and receives a total pay-off of $200,000. The $100,000 difference between the amount borrowed and the amount ultimately paid back is the amount of the loan the bank has forgiven. This $100,000 is a type of principal reduction and generally subject to ordinary income taxes.

However, at the start of the housing crisis in 2007, Congress enacted the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, which exempts precisely this phantom income from federal taxation. The term of the law was extended in 2008. But the current law expires at the end of 2012, and it is by no means clear that it will be extended. Moreover, the seeming lack of public discussion about the need to extend it is shocking.

(There are a complex array of qualifying circumstances and exemptions surrounding this tax issue, including the laws of the individual state involved, the solvency of the homeowner, whether the homeowner is in bankruptcy, whether the sale involves a primary residence, refinancing associated with the property, and a variety of other factors related to qualifying for the federal exemption. In particular, short sales in nonrecourse states (which include California) are not considered debt forgiven and therefore, if no other income-generating activities apply, do not trigger federal taxes. But this post does not address the many nuances involved in these issues.)

It’s virtually impossible to imagine that struggling families who are selling underwater homes at a large loss (and have already lost a large chunk of their life savings as the value of their home equity, including their down-payment, was vaporized in the housing crisis) will go forward with short sales. The vast majority of homeowners will not be able to afford the resulting tax debt. So one consequence of a failure to extend this law is likely to be an immediate end to the vast majority of short sales, which have been increasing rapidly. Short sales constituted an estimated 24 percent of all January 2012 home sales and surpassed the estimated 20 percent of all January sales comprised of foreclosed homes.

For the same reasons, all efforts at principal reduction will be stopped cold at the end of this year. Homeowners who are struggling to meet their monthly obligations are unlikely to be able to accept sizeable principle reductions that will create large income tax obligations that they can’t afford. This means Obama’s debt principal reduction initiative will never get off the ground.

Congressional opponents of renewing this legislation estimate that the cost of extending the exemption at $2.7 Billion, a large enough cost to lead them to oppose the measure. Members of Congress may also oppose extending the exemption as an unfair benefit to individuals whom they deem irresponsible, which is subsidized by taxpayers who did the right thing and paid off their mortgages. Finally, in this election year, it’s easy to imagine that legislation of all kinds could grow hostage to partisan gridlock.

The source of this cost Congressional cost estimate is unknown. But, it is almost certainly wrong.  It appears to assume that without this exemption short sales will continue to dominate the fragile housing market, thereby generating new income tax revenues. In fact, the best conclusion is that, if the exemption disappears, so will short sales and any accompanying tax revenues. The real cost of failing to extend this exemption is the unacceptable risks it poses to any housing recovery and the economy at large. The idea that tax revenues will be lost is a fiction.

Moreover, arguments related to individual responsibility are disingenuous. Over the past several years financial executives have avoided accountability for their actions. Indeed, there have been no substantive congressional hearings on massive law-breaking by financial executives, such as the congressionally sponsored Pecora Hearings in the era of the New Deal.

I would suggest that these disingenuous arguments by some members of congress are a further indicator of the consequences of extreme inequality afflicting the nation. They demonstrate an unacceptable double-standard: One set of laws and permissive irresponsibility for those at the top of the society, and one set of rules for everyone else. They also vividly demonstrate a natural consequence of extreme inequality: Societies grow harsher. As inequality increases, those at the top lose empathy for the less fortunate, including the formerly middle class. As a result, the elites lose their view of the nation as one community, and rationalize actions of all types that they would find abhorrent if the shoe were on the other foot.

Congressional opponents of renewing this legislation are assuming a lack of potentially severe consequences. It’s impossible to predict what might happen, but the downside risks are unquestionably high. It raises the real risk of directly leading housing prices to decline further or even plummet for a variety of reasons. Efforts at principal reduction could come to a stop as the public loses confidence in a housing recovery, the end of short sales could have a strong negative impact on the housing market, or underwater homeowners fearing tax consequences could decide to walk away from their homes, leading to a massive increase in the inventory of newly empty homes that banks must ultimately resell.

None of this may happen, but the risks are real and unacceptable. A substantial drop in housing prices will almost certainly harm or destroy the already tepid pace of our economic recovery. Congress and the Obama administration are playing with fire. Sometimes those who do so remain unscathed, but sometimes they get burned.

Congressional inaction also fails the pro-capitalism test. As an economic system, capitalism is intended to build the overall wealth of a society. To properly function, capitalism requires an equal playing field, absolute accountability for business decisions, and rules ensuring that markets function fairly. As I have repeatedly argued, the many failures of lawmakers and administration officials to hold the financial services sector to a capitalist model has created a financial sector that is anti-capitalist and wealth-destroying. The current predicament of homeowners who might rely on this lifeline is a direct result of this failure. To now penalize the weakest link in the chain is a further demonstration that we have created an economic system that is not fair capitalism, where everyone lives up to their responsibilities and is accountable for their actions.

Capitalism only works when the citizenry believes it leads to fair outcomes. Our nation has already reached dangerous levels of anger. The lack of trust in our institutions is pervasive, and Americans who have always been regarded as optimists have turned cynical and lost hope. By taxing struggling families on phantom income, Congress will reinforce the belief that our economy is blatantly unfair and further wear away the remaining thread of our painfully frayed social fabric.

It’s now a near certainty that Wall Street executives committed felonies.

The recently released audits of robo-mortgage activities by the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) details shocking behavior at the five banks constituting the Federal Housing Administration’s largest mortgage servicers. At Wells Fargo, management quashed a midlevel manager’s study of the foreclosure process as negative results began to emerge, and it gave an individual whose last job had been in a pizza restaurant the title of “vice-president of loan documentation” to facilitate robo-mortgage signing. Bank of America evaluated employees on the volume of foreclosure affidavits produced. JP Morgan Chase gave individuals titles such as “vice-president of Chase Home” where “the titles were given by Chase for the sole purpose of allowing individuals to sign documents and came with no other duties or authority.” Citigroup and Ally similarly engaged in seemingly illegal practices.

Under federal law, the knowing filing of a false affidavit with the court is a felony offense of perjury, punishable by a prison term of up to five years. An individualviolates laws against perjury whether he or she personally appears in court and swears to a false statement or provides the court with a false affidavit. Individual states have their own perjury laws, which were undoubtedly violated as well. The HUD report also suggests that individual banks may be guilty of obstruction of justiceand the criminal violation of the False Claims Act for filing insurance claims without following HUD requirements.

Since the start of the financial crisis, federal and state officials have been struggling to change Wall Street behavior. To date, every effort has failed miserably, and theweak enforcement provisions of the robo-mortgage settlement are unlikely to meaningfully change this dynamic. Government officials have also relied, with a very few exceptions, entirely on civil enforcement when criminal laws appear to have been egregiously violated.

The greatest moral hazard now confronting the nation is what appears to be increasingly brazen criminal activity by financial industry executives. With each decision not to prosecute, Wall Street executives justifiably conclude that they are immune to the rules. As a result, it appears that Wall Street criminal activity is increasing in frequency and severity, as opposed to the reverse. The activities surrounding the collapse of MF Global are one example.

So what can be done about it? We can change the behavior in the financial service industry for a full generation in just seven days. This plan may seem to be tongue and cheek, but it hearkens back to a similar action in the era of the Great Depression. In the final months of Herbert Hoover’s presidency, the Senate Banking Committee began an investigation into the causes of the Great Crash of 1929, and a young prosecutor named Ferdinand Pecora was appointed as Chief Counsel. Subsequently, the Roosevelt administration conveyed to Pecora that “the prosecution of an outstanding violator of the banking law would be the most salutary action that could be taken at this time. The feeling is that if the people become convinced that the big violators are to be punished, it will be helpful in restoring confidence.” Ultimately, this investigation, which came to be known as the Pecora Commission, led to the indictment of one of America’s most prominent financiers; demonstrated widespread self-dealing in the financial sector; and, as noted by historian Alan Brinkley, generated “broad popular support” for Roosevelt’s reform agenda, including the creation of the SEC and the Glass-Steagall Act.

Buy a copy of The Unfinished Revolution: Voices from the Global Fight for Women’s Rights, featuring a chapter by Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow Ellen Chesler.

My seven day plan is based on a simple premise: When criminal laws are egregiously violated, the guilty parties should face appropriate punishment. Here’s the plan:

Day One: Read the HUD Inspector General’s reports and the public records of past mortgage foreclosure cases from across the nation.

Day Two: Meet with the team at the Office of the Inspector General at HUD that prepared the audits. Obtain the names of all the bank officials, lawyers, and notaries whose behavior, as cited in the audit reports or otherwise known to the investigators, represent clear and unquestionable criminal violations. Add to this list other individuals who have similarly demonstrated or testified to behavior unquestionably constituting criminal acts, as indicated by the public records of the mortgage foreclosure cases reviewed in day one.

Day Three: Indict all of the individuals on the list compiled on day two.

Day Four: Indict banks and financial institutions on criminal charges where criminal behavior by employees (as demonstrated by day three indictments) appears to be endemic. The Justice Department guidelines for prosecuting firms include: (1) the pervasiveness of such activity, (2) the compliance procedures in place, (3) attempts by the corporation to end bad behavior, and (4) cooperation with federal investigators. In 2008, the Justice Department adopted a policy of accepting “deferred prosecutions,” involving agreements to change corporate behavior without damaging innocent third parties through prosecution.

Corporations receive the benefits of “legal persons,” as demonstrated by Citizens United. But they must also bear the responsibilities of these privileges. A reading of the HUD reports, and other public records, suggests several banks should clearly be prosecuted.

Day 5: Discuss plea bargains with indicted lower-level officials in return for cooperating in investigations of higher-level officials.

Day 6: Consider plea bargains with indicted banks, which require the removal of all remaining officers and directors who were serving when egregious criminal activity occurred, as well as senior officials who were in a position to exercise appropriate supervisory responsibility but chose to look the other way.

Day 7: Indict any senior Wall Street officials implicated by new cooperative testimony resulting from activities on day five. Adopt and announce a policy that future criminal violations will be prosecuted in a similar fashion.

What is particularly disturbing is that a look at the evidence already in the public domain (much less what investigators already know) shows that none of the actions discussed above are entirely absurd. The purpose of prosecution not simply punishment. It acts to deter further illegal activity and to restore public confidence in our system of governance. The nation desperately needs both of these benefits today.

Moreover, these ongoing, almost certainly criminal activities are ultimately dangerous threats to our economy, the success of capitalism, and our democracy. In his column New York Times column on the collapse of MF Global, Joe Nocera noted that “customers need to be able to trust” the laws protecting their money. “Otherwise, the markets can’t function.”

Today, as in the era of FDR, we must send a message to the financial community that illegal behavior will not be tolerated. By prosecuting blatant felonies now, we will deter future misbehavior and begin the process of recreating a fair society where equal justice prevails.

Extreme economic inequality is among the most destructive forces in a society. As inequality grows, it undermines the effective functioning of the economy, the basic tenets of capitalism, and the foundations of democracy.

Unfortunately, the housing crisis and now the housing settlement increasingly look like an example of how this mechanism works.

One of the central characteristics of highly unequal societies is that two sets of laws develop: One set for the rich and powerful and one set for everyone else. The more unequal societies become, the more easily they accept the unacceptable, and with each unrebuked violation, the powerful actors at the top of the society gain an ever greater sense of entitlement and an ever greater sense that the laws that govern everyone else don’t apply to them. As a result, their behavior becomes increasingly egregious.

In contrast, sustainable capitalism requires that all participants in a contract or bargain believe their interests will be enforced equally by the courts: Capitalism requires that Lady Justice wear a blindfold. When powerful players are permitted to alter established rules at will, capitalism ultimately collapses. Contracts and the idea of a fair bargain become meaningless as less powerful parties to an agreement know their rights will not be enforced. Over time, citizens lose faith in government and their own ability to thrive in what becomes a corrupt economy. This uncertainty leads the small businesses, which are so often cited as important to our economy, to shy away from new activities that might put them at the risk of unequal treatment.

I would suggest that the robo-mortgage scandal is a strong indicator that this type of unequal justice is now becoming ever more commonplace in America. Past bank abuses are typically discussed without a sense of outrage. They have, in effect, become a recognized practice of deception with no consequences. Here are three prominent examples from the past few years:

First, the robo-mortgage scandal was discovered. As powerful members of society, the banks effectively decided what laws they wanted to follow and disregarded others. The banks claimed that their violations were technical and harmed no one. Nonetheless, the activities of the banks constituted massive fraud, perjury, and conspiracy. Bank officials have testified in court that they filed as many as10,000 false affidavits a month. These are effectively undeniable admissions of law-breaking on a massive scale.

It’s a federal crime, punishable by up of five years of imprisonment, to knowingly file a false affidavit with the court. From the perspective of the law, you are guilty of the same perjury, when you falsely testify in court or when you submit a false affidavit. In most states, filing false affidavits with the court similarly constitutes a felony offense of perjury.

If an individual citizen perpetrated this kind of massive perjury, he or she would be prosecuted. For illegal activities to take place on this type of massive scale, other serious crimes, such as conspiracy, are almost certainly committed as well.

Last week an audit of San Francisco mortgage practices, the first systematic audit in the nation, revealed that an astounding 82 percent of the cases analyzed involved suspicious activity by the foreclosing institution and concluded that a large portion of these activities probably involved felony violations of California perjury laws.

Second, when Martha Coakley, the attorney general of Massachusetts filed a civil suit related to the robo-mortgage scandal against several financial institutions, she was demonized by the financial services industry and appropriately recognized for her bravery by housing advocates seeking to end abusive bank practices.

What is noteworthy, however, is that Coakley filed a civil suit. This was a lenient effort as she undoubtedly had the ability to build a compelling criminal case against the banks (as institutions) and the bank officers who knowingly created the robo-mortgage scheme.

Third, the national housing settlement, involving the federal and state governments, was announced almost two weeks ago. A central concern associated with the settlement is how it will be enforced. The banks have a long and well-documented history, of agreeing to settlements that will change their behavior and then failing to live up to these binding agreements. Moreover, penalties for failure to comply with these settlements are rarely, if ever, assessed.

In her New York Times feature story, The Deal is Done, but Hold the Applause, Gretchen Morgenson wrote about this behavior, and how it relates to the current settlement:

“But perhaps the largest question looming over this settlement is how it will be policed. Recent history is littered with agreements that required banks to take specific steps to make amends. All too often, the banks have skated away from their promises.”

Morgenson then recounts a series of instances where the banks failed to comply with past settlements, including this quote from a former judge involved in these processes and her conclusion:

“‘It’s astounding that in such a huge percentage of cases the lenders are not complying,’; said Philip A. Olsen, a former Nevada Supreme Court settlement conference judge.”The banks have learned that they can thumb their noses at the program and it won’t cost them anything.”

So you have to wonder whether banks will thumb their noses at last week’s settlement, too. That makes policing compliance crucial.”

The full details of the settlement have not been released, but unfortunately, the most recent disclosures suggest that this enforcement power and large penalties per violation are wishful thinking. An executive summary of the provisions of the settlement can be found here. It states, among other things: “If banks fail to remedy violations, they are subject to civil penalties of up to $5 million from the court.”(emphasis added)

While the full details may indicate otherwise, the process as described here seems to be a far cry from substantial penalties of $1 million to $5 million for each failure of compliance that some media reports appeared to suggest.

Why does the monitor need to provide the banks with a chance to remedy violations of the settlement? The banks certainly know what they are supposed to be doing. It’s one indication that the banks will be able to pursue the changes requires by the without a sense of urgency.

With no set penalty formula the same banks which have argued that over 10,000 knowing violations of the law harmed no one, will undoubtedly argue–perhaps for years–that any violations of the settlement are inevitable consequences of glitches in operating a new system, have no practical impact, don’t merit fines of any kind.

In addition, have the banks agreed that they will not contest the monitor’s request of penalties to the court? If not, then, as I have previously noted a court fight over each penalty can—and most probably will—ensue, with the possibility that the entire monitoring process is a charade.

I hope that I am wrong, but the above analysis certainly suggests that, in Morgenson’s words, banks will have the opportunity to “thumb their noses at [the] settlement” without incurring serious penalties.

If the enforcement provisions of the settlement prove to be meaningless, Americans will rightfully believe they have been misled by public officials to believe the settlement included stiff penalties to ensure violations did not occur.

The stakes here are enormous. They extend beyond the housing market to the nature of American society itself. The banks’ blatant malfeasance with regard to the robo-mortgage scandal and other foreclosure-related activities have been a clear example of unequal enforcement of the laws. Now, the settlement may serve as another example that equal justice through equal enforcement of the laws, which is necessary for sustainable capitalism, no longer prevails in America.

Yale’s Robert Dahl, one of the preeminent political scientists of our era, wrote in 2006 in On Political Equality (Yale University Press) of the risks of rising economic inequality, which is inevitably accompanied by political power which also concentrates at the top of the society:

“The unequal accumulation of political resources points to an ominous possibility: political inequalities may be ratcheted up, so to speak, to a level from which they cannot be ratcheted down. The cumulative advantages in power, influence, and authority of the more privileged strata may become so great that .. a majority of ordinary citizens…are simply unable…to overcome the forces of inequality arrayed against them.”

I fervently hope we are not living out the ominous possibility Professor Dahl raises.

President Obama has declared income inequality to be “the defining issue of our time.” I agree, but I am terrified that the most recent news related to the housing settlement is not the definition the president intends.

An earlier version of this article appeared in the Restoring Capitalism series of the New Deal 2.0 blog, a project of the Roosevelt Institute.

The country’s banks agreed to change their behavior as part of the robo-mortgage settlement announced earlier this week. The announcement, however, leaves open a central question: Does the settlement include new, pre-defined penalties for banks that fail to uphold their new promises? Since a change in bank behavior is a vital piece of the settlement, the absence of an answer is highly disconcerting.

When the deal was announced, the Associated Press reported reported:

“The conditions will be overseen by Joseph A Smith Jr., North Carolina’s banking commissioner. Lenders that violate the deal could face $1 million penalties per violation and up to $5 million for repeat violators.”

The initial impression on reading this report is that there are real teeth to it. It sounds like the banks are agreeing to pay $1 million dollars each time they fail to perform as promised.

However, the actual press release from the Department of Justice announcing the deal reads (emphasis added):

“Compliance with the agreement will be overseen by an independent monitor, Joseph A. Smith Jr. Smith has served as the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks since 2002… The monitor will oversee implementation of the servicing standards required by the agreement; impose penalties of up to $1 million per violation (or up to $5 million for certain repeat violations); and publish regular public reports that identify any quarter in which a servicer fell short of the standards imposed in the settlement.”

There are two open questions. First, what does “up to” mean? Does the independent monitor have discretion over the size of each penalty? This could effectively make the million dollar figures announced by the Justice Department meaningless. Banks have argued that the tens of thousands of robo-mortgage signatures and well-documented servicing errors were all technical violations that harmed no one. Undoubtedly, they will argue that any single violation was a meaningless error.

This provision would have real meaning if we applied the same standard our nation has applied in other areas: a zero tolerance rule. What would happen if each bank knew that any violation would result in a minimum fine of $1 million? I suspect bank behavior would change significantly.

Second, can banks contest these fines? Have the banks agreed that they will pay any fines assessed by the independent monitor? If not, then once again the provisions have the potential to be meaningless. The monitor will assess fines for violations and the banks will challenge the fines through whatever venues, the courts or otherwise, have been established by the settlement. The judgment and ability of the independent monitor to set fines will have been eviscerated.

Efforts to determine answers to these and related questions have seemingly been rebuffed. The Huffington Post reported on its efforts to understand the details of the enforcement provisions of the settlement:

“North Carolina banking commissioner Joseph Smith will serve as the national monitor of the deal, working from Raleigh…

The announcement on Thursday did not include any new information on bank penalties. A call to Smith’s office was not immediately returned. A HUD spokesman did not immediately return an e-mailed request for comment.”

There appears to be near universal agreement that this settlement will do little for homeowners who have been the victims of past bad bank behavior. But there may be real value in the deal if it successfully changes bank behavior going forward. The New York Times quoted Roy Cooper, the attorney general of North Carolina as saying, “This agreement is more important for the foreclosures we’re hoping to prevent” (emphasis added).

At the same time, The New York Times wrote, “Advocates for homeowners facing foreclosure expressed cautious optimism,” but indicated that these same advocates believe rigorous enforcement is essential for the program to work:

“We’re hopeful,” said Joseph Sant, a lawyer at Staten Island Legal Services’ homeowner defense project. “But we had a lot of programs that are good on paper. What will make the difference is that it’s vigorously enforced.”

The stakes here are enormous. They extend beyond the housing market to the nature of American society itself. The banks’ blatant malfeasance with regard to the robo-mortgage scandal and other foreclosure-related activities has been a clear example of unequal justice. The banks have knowingly and repeatedly violated laws (such as providing tens of thousands of false affidavits to the courts) that would have landed an ordinary citizen in jail.

At the same time, successful capitalism itself depends on the enforcement of rules and contracts in a fair bargain that all participants believe will be enforced by the courts. When powerful players are permitted to alter established rules at will, capitalism ultimately collapses. Contracts and the idea of a fair bargain become meaningless as less powerful parties to an agreement know their rights will not be enforced. Over time, citizens lose faith in government and their own ability to thrive in what becomes a corrupt economy.

If the settlement enforcement provisions turn out to lack substance, these forces will be reinforced rather than counteracted. We must wait for the details. Like homeowner defense advocates, I am cautiously optimistic — but terrified that ultimately I will be disappointed.

This article originally appeared on the New Deal 2.0 blog a project of The Rossevelt Institute.

In the article, I wrote that while the banks have insisted for the past several years that the robo-mortgage violations represented minor technical issues, which harmed no one. Recently, a far more grave explanation has emerged: The possibility that the scandal was the back-end of activities that appear to represent tax evasion, the failure to comply with basic rules in securitizing mortgages, and massive fraud on the purchasers of the securitized mortgage bonds.

Now, I have received numerous requests to clarify this extraordinary alternative explanation.

It’s complex, but here goes: First, as Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism explains, it appears the specific mortgages which were the assets comprising the securitized bonds were never actually transferred to the bonds, within the required time period (90 days under New York law).

By way of background: remember that the big concern about the release was that it would go beyond robosigning and waive other types of liability. The ones observers were most concerned about were what we called chain of title issues, namely that the parties that had put mortgage securitizations together had failed on a widespread basis to take the steps stipulated in their own contracts to transfer the notes (and in lien theory states, to assign the lien) properly.

The securitization agreements were rigid, requiring that the transfers through multiple parties be completed by a date certain, typically 90 days after the closing of the trust. Most deals elected New York law as the governing law for the trusts, and New York law allows them to operate only as stipulated. Since the notes were supposed to be transferred in by a particular date, trying to move them in later is a “void act” having no legal effect. That makes attempts to make transfers legally at this juncture a non-starter.

Having realized somewhat late in the game that their failure to do what they promised could interfere with trusts’ ability to foreclose and create tons of liability, servicers and their various agents have relied on not just robosiging, but widespread document fabrication and forgeries to fix their transfer problem when judges have taken notice. Anyone who has been on this beat knows of numerous cases where foreclosure documents are challenged, say for being too late, not having the right transfers, etc, that new versions of supposedly original documents that tell the right story miraculously show up in court.

Second, Ellen Brown, the President of The Public Banking Institute, explains the implications of this failure to abide by the 90 day deadline:

Since 1986, mortgage-backed securities have been issued to investors through SPVs [Special Purpose Vehicles] called REMICs (Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits). REMICs are designed as tax shelters; but to qualify for that status, they must be “static.” Mortgages can’t be transferred in and out once the closing date has occurred. The REMIC Pooling and Servicing Agreement typically states that any transfer significantly after the closing date is invalid. Yet the newly robo-signed documents, which are required to begin foreclosure proceedings, are almost always executed long after the trust’s closing date.

Third, as Brown also notes, the liabilities associated with a failure to transfer the documents on time came to head when:

Fannie Mae sent out a memo telling servicers that in order to be reimbursed under HAMP–a government loan modification program designed to help at-risk homeowners meet their mortgage payments–the servicers would have to produce the paperwork showing the loan had been assigned to the trust.

Brown believes that, as a result,

The hasty solution was a rash of assignments signed by an army of “robosigners,” to be filed in the public records…

This explains why, as noted by Brown above, “the newly filed robo-signed documents” are “almost always executed long after the trusts closing date.”

All of this is undoubtedly highly complex. And, I am not in a position to investigate whether it is true. However, the implications of these assertions are grave. If the mortgages were knowingly assigned to the REMICS after the closing date, then the tax benefits of the REMICS appear to be invalid. If so, these transfers (as I understand the law) represent tax evasion by the banks. As part of an ongoing scheme, they also constitute, in all likelihood, conspiracy and fraud on the bond purchasers.

With regard to the bond purchasers, as Yves Smith notes above, the failure to adequately establish the trusts created “tons of liability” for the banks to these purchasers; since the banks then effectively misrepresented the nature of the bonds they were selling.

At the moment, the important question here is not whether these allegations are true. What’s important is that their appears to be enough evidence to warrant at least a minimal investigation of these astounding assertions: The possibility that for years the banks have been knowingly misleading the public and the government on the extent to which robo-mortgage scandal activities were merely technical violations versus the back-end of potentially serious criminal activities and an attempt to evade enormous liabilities.

If we are a nation where justice is blind, should we not investigate this possibility before we give the offending financial institutions another free pass?

The essence of an effective capitalist system is rules and accountability. For markets, and our larger economy to work, important players cannot be permitted to make up their own rules. In all likelihood, a settlement next week means these serious questions will never be answered.

Tomorrow is the deadline for state attorneys general to sign on to a joint federal and multi-state $25 billion settlement of the robo-mortgage scandal. The settlement will involve Ally Financial Inc. (formerly GMAC), Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and Wells Fargo & Co. The details of the proposed settlement have not been released. However, one thing is clear: This settlement puts the nation at further risk of another systematic financial crisis and runs counter to any notion that the actions of the Obama administration will reflect the president’s newly energized populist rhetoric.

As a nation, we need to ask several questions. As a participatory democracy, we also have the right to the answers before any settlement is inked:

1. In his State of the Union Address, President Obama announced a new financial crimes taskforce, yet the administration is rushing to finalize this settlement before the taskforce begins its work. Why?

2. What is the public interest in releasing banks that have openly admitted they broke the law by signing false affidavits in tens of thousands of separate instances from liability?

3. The bank narrative has been that the robo-mortgage scandal reflected technical issues which harmed no one. Recently, new allegations have emerged that suggest these activities were actually the back-end of even greater malfeasance involving tax evasion, the failure to comply with basic rules in securitizing mortgages, and an attempt to avoid high liabilities on the part of the banks to the purchasers of the mortgage bonds.

These allegations operate as follows. First, as Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism explains, it appears the specific mortgages which were the assets comprising the securitized bonds were never actually transferred to the bonds, within the required time period (90 days under New York law).

By way of background: remember that the big concern about the release was that it would go beyond robosigning and waive other types of liability. The ones observers were most concerned about were what we called chain of title issues, namely that the parties that had put mortgage securitizations together had failed on a widespread basis to take the steps stipulated in their own contracts to transfer the notes (and in lien theory states, to assign the lien) properly.

The securitization agreements were rigid, requiring that the transfers through multiple parties be completed by a date certain, typically 90 days after the closing of the trust. Most deals elected New York law as the governing law for the trusts, and New York law allows them to operate only as stipulated. Since the notes were supposed to be transferred in by a particular date, trying to move them in later is a “void act” having no legal effect. That makes attempts to make transfers legally at this juncture a non-starter.

Having realized somewhat late in the game that their failure to do what they promised could interfere with trusts’ ability to foreclose and create tons of liability, servicers and their various agents have relied on not just robosiging, but widespread document fabrication and forgeries to fix their transfer problem when judges have taken notice. Anyone who has been on this beat knows of numerous cases where foreclosure documents are challenged, say for being too late, not having the right transfers, etc, that new versions of supposedly original documents that tell the right story miraculously show up in court.

Second, Ellen Brown, the President of The Public Banking Institute, explains the implications of this failure to abide by the 90 day deadline:

Since 1986, mortgage-backed securities have been issued to investors through SPVs [Special Purpose Vehicles] called REMICs (Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits). REMICs are designed as tax shelters; but to qualify for that status, they must be “static.” Mortgages can’t be transferred in and out once the closing date has occurred. The REMIC Pooling and Servicing Agreement typically states that any transfer significantly after the closing date is invalid. Yet the newly robo-signed documents, which are required to begin foreclosure proceedings, are almost always executed long after the trust’s closing date.

Third, as Brown also notes, the liabilities associated with a failure to transfer the documents on time came to head when:

Fannie Mae sent out a memo telling servicers that in order to be reimbursed under HAMP–a government loan modification program designed to help at-risk homeowners meet their mortgage payments–the servicers would have to produce the paperwork showing the loan had been assigned to the trust.

Brown believes that, as a result,

The hasty solution was a rash of assignments signed by an army of “robosigners,” to be filed in the public records

This explains why, as noted by Brown above, “the newly filed robo-signed documents” are “almost always executed long after the trusts closing date.”

All of this is undoubtedly highly complex. And, I am not in a position to investigate whether it is true. However, the implications of these assertions are grave. If the mortgages were knowingly assigned to the REMICS after the closing date, then the tax benefits of the REMICS appear to be invalid. If so, these transfers appear to represent tax evasion by the banks. As part of an ongoing scheme, they also constitute, in all likelihood, conspiracy and fraud on the bond purchasers.

With regard to the bond purchasers, as Yves Smith notes above, the failure to adequately establish the trusts created “tons of liability” for the banks to these purchasers; since the banks then effectively misrepresented the nature of the bonds they were selling.

At the moment, the important question here is not whether these allegations are true. What’s important is that their appears to be enough evidence to warrant at least a minimal investigation of these astounding assertions–which suggests that a large part of the robo-mortgage scandal was the back-end of potentially serious criminal activities and an attempt to evade enormous liabilities.

In all likelihood, tomorrow’s settlement means these serious questions will never be answered.

If we are a nation where justice is blind, should we not investigate the full truth before we give the offending financial institutions another free pass?

4. Why are the terms of this settlement secret? Prosecutorial negotiations are normally secret in order to prevent the disclosure of evidence that might or might not be relevant to a later trial if the negotiations collapse. This concern does not apply here.

5. This settlement has far more of the characteristics of legislation than of prosecutorial activities. The offending banks have destroyed the wealth, livelihood, and dreams of millions of Americans. Shouldn’t the public at least have two weeks to view the proposed terms of the settlement and make their views known to their state’s attorney general? And at a time when trust in government is at historic lows, isn’t secrecy for this type of activity the wrong way to build the much-needed confidence of the American people?

6. The press also has a constitutionally guaranteed role in our system of governance. In these unusual circumstances, isn’t this precisely the type of situation where the nation would benefit from careful scrutiny of the intended settlement by the press?

7. Officials have indicated that the settlement will require banks to write down the principal on homeowner loans. Unfortunately, a portion of the $25 billion allocated for this purpose is far too little, spread across a large number of homeowners, for any write-downs to make an effective difference. So either these statements are effectively meaningless, or the settlement is based on promises of future activities by banks. To date, the nation has witnessed repeated and egregious failures by the banks to live up to promises of future behavior, with no subsequent penalties for such failures. For any release from liabilities to be effective, shouldn’t it be contingent on the banks actually delivering on these promises?

Since the start of the economic crisis, none of the administration’s housing policies have succeeded. Each policy initiative has been fatally flawed. As a consequence, there’s no reason to believe that the policy pursued in the current settlement will aid, rather than hurt, the housing market. Meanwhile, the secrecy surrounding this policy initiative makes its potential positive contribution to the crisis even more suspect.

A month ago, I wrote that we were a nation in denial with regard to housing prices and the impact of ongoing foreclosures. Despite a favorable rent to buy ratio, ultra-low interest rates and an “all time low cost of owning a home,” housing prices are continuing downward. There is a simple explanation. With foreclosures and the so-called shadow inventory of homes, our housing supply will overshadow demand for many years to come.

With 29 percent of homeowners already underwater, this creates a massive risk for the economy. Some analysts predict that home prices will drop another 10 to 20 percent, which will put many borrowers deeply underwater. With additional price declines, underwater homeowners may start to simply walk away in droves. This will create havoc for our economy, the mortgage securities markets, and it will destroy solvency of the banks as they are forced to write-down their portfolios. The nation will be plunged into another economic crisis.

Unfortunately, all indications over the past several weeks are that this risk is continuing to grow. Indeed, the most recent reports on housing prices showed larger than expected declines in November. This reflected the third month in a row of declines. “The trend is down and there are few, if any, signs in the numbers that a turning point is close at hand,” said David M. Blitzer, chairman of the S&P’s home price index committee.

In his State of the Union speech, President Obama stressed assistance for “responsible homeowners.” Yet the current definition of a responsible homeowner is someone with a job. (Although yesterday the president did say, “We’re working to make sure people don’t lose their homes just because they lost their job.” ) So, at least for the moment, continued unemployment woes will keep this vicious cycle going.

Here’s how this relates to the proposed settlement: All of the activities covered by the settlement took place after the crisis began. They were not unforeseen effects of once-in-a-lifetime systematic risk. They reflected willful and knowing disrespect for the rule of law. To date, documents provided by the banks to the Courts, as well as accompanying testimony, demonstrate that laws were broken on a massive scale. The essence of capitalism is responsibility and accountability. The settlement ignores both. (See the letter below from a Michigan County official asking the Michigan Attorney General to “refuse” to join the settlement)

In 2010, Richard Cordray, then Ohio Attorney General, sued GMAC seeking a $25,000 fine for each false affidavit filed. Now, the open question is what is the potential liability of the banks, absent a settlement, for the robo-mortgage activities. The banks desire to settle at $25 billion is one indicator that their actual liability is probably far higher. My suspicion is that the total liability, including all punitive damages for criminal and civil malfeasance, would be sufficient to make the banks insolvent. This means that, because of the banks’ malfeasance and greed, the nation has the leverage to bargain for a massive write-down of mortgages — thereby preventing an economic catastrophe. I am not advocating this option, nor am I saying it is good policy. But I do believe it would be a scandal to limit whatever leverage we have to save our economy by once again permitting gross malfeasance.

In late May, my eldest daughter will graduate from college and join the labor force. Will there be jobs for her and her classmates? Will she come of age in a decade of limited employment opportunities, the collapse of the middle class, and unequal justice while a privileged few live lives of abundance because they have corrupted our democracy? As someone who reveres our system of justice, what is the advice I should give her about working hard and playing by the rules? There is still a chance that we can turn all of this around. But rushing to settle with law-breaking banks is certainly not the way to solve the issue of inequality — which President Obama called the defining issue of our time. It is also the antithesis of capitalism, which is based on adherence to law, a fair bargain, and accountability.

This article originally appeared as part of the Restoring Capitalism series, of the New Deal 2.0 blog, a project of the Roosevelt Institute.

In early December, the Justice Department confirmed that it was investigating the pricing of e-books and the related activities of major publishers and online retailers, such as Amazon.com and Apple. As a print and digital author, participant in the publishing industry, and graduate of the Yale Law School, this naturally caught my eye. It also led me to start thinking about the assumptions that underlie existing antitrust laws.

Democracy is the basis of our form of government. Capitalism is the basis of our economic system. They are distinct systems, and (at least in theory) it’s possible to have one without the other. But will the antitrust rules developed to foster capitalism in the previous century inadvertently weaken our democracy in this century? In addition, do pre-digital era antitrust doctrines hinder the development of a fair, robust capitalism in our age? The current Justice Department investigation is a case study for examining these issues.

Lengthy, reasoned arguments (i.e. books) have historically played a central role in the marketplace of ideas. Important books have changed the way we look at our society, altered our political beliefs, changed foreign policy, and moved the nation in myriad ways. In the digital era, we benefit from many new forms of disseminating information, such as blogs and online news sources, all of which add to the marketplace of ideas. Nonetheless, none of these new sources of information has replaced the essential nature of a book (in physical or digital form): a lengthy effort, researched and written over a long period of time, which reflects the author’s most thoughtful analysis and reflections on the subject in question.

The research and creation of many significant, important works are funded by advances from book companies. The book company grants the money up front on the basis of a proposal, which allows the author to pursue the project while earning a living. Hypothetically, if publishers stopped offering advances, many important works would never be created. Authors (who are not always academics or paid foundation researchers with a guaranteed salary) simply could not afford to undertake the work. This capitalist, for-profit motive plays an important role in funding important contributions to the marketplace of ideas.

Today, the book industry is struggling to adapt to the digital transformation. At its core, digital information has a tough time establishing value in the eyes of the consumer. If the book industry declines, some authors will undoubtedly self-publish, and it’s possible new financing vehicles, for the equivalent of today’s advances, will evolve. In essence, a weaker book industry means our society loses a source of funding for important, time-consuming, and extensive research and analysis.

The Justice Department has not revealed the precise nature of the investigation. But it’s my understanding that when the Kindle was first released, Amazon.com priced e-books at less than the wholesale cost it was paying publishers. In effect, to boost Kindle sales and the idea of e-reading in general, Amazon was often taking a loss on sales.

A long-held tenant of antitrust law is that vertical price fixing (an agreement between the manufacturer and the retailer to sell a product at a specific price) is often illegal. These restrictions are why manufacturers offer products with a “manufacturer’s suggested retail price” (”the MSRP”). The manufacturer is not permitted to formally agree with retailers on the prices consumers pay for products. The retailer is free to set the price offered to consumers, thereby enabling discounts from the MSRP. (Note: In recent years, the Supreme Court has adopted a moreflexible approach to the issue or vertical price fixing, adopting a “rule of reason” test, but it remains a central area of antitrust policy.) In addition, competitors cannot work together to restrain price competition in some way (horizontal price fixing).

As the e-book business started to develop, publishers were concerned that Amazon’s pricing approach was devaluing their products and (I assume) threatening to destroy hardcover sales at bookstores. In response, publishers developed what is known in the industry as “the agency model.” Under this model, the publisher sets the price the consumer pays. In this model the digital retailer is not buying the product at a wholesale price, but acting as a sort of sales agent for the publisher. As the sales agent, the retailer receives a commission on each sale. In effect, digital book purchases become like insurance policy purchases, with Amazon and Apple as the brokers. From the perspective of antitrust law, the actual seller is the publisher, which sells through an agent and no agreement in restraint of trade exists. My assumption is that the Justice Department is investigating whether this agency pricing model violates restrictions on vertical price fixing and whether the way it was deployed by multiple publishers reflects some form of horizontal price fixing.

It’s easy to have a knee-jerk negative reaction to the higher e-book prices that publishers have set under the agency model. But here’s where this all gets interesting. As the (now barely existent) music industry and suffering newspaper industry have learned, it’s incredibly hard to establish value for digital content. This reflects the competitive marketplace that may make content available for free, consumer perceptions of what they should pay for digital goods, the availability of other revenues streams (such as advertising), and a host of other factors.

One undeniable effect is that the Internet inherently drives the value of digital goods down. Instant price comparisons, easy access to lower-priced alternative options for digital information and entertainment, and illegal file sharing all contribute to this phenomenon. Traditional publishers also face challenges in making the digital transition. Importantly, a host of new competitors that help authors create digital books have arisen, and authors can also publish on their own. So the competitive dynamic for digital books, with far easier access to low-priced and free alternatives as well as all kinds of new types of publishers and distribution models, is very different than the dynamic that existed when vertical pricing restrictions were first developed.

There is a second, more fundamental issue at work here. The digital world makes the bundling (whether explicit or implicit) of intellectual property far easier than the physical world. Companies can make their profit in one place and break even or lose money on other products to support this activity. The problem is that this kind of activity destroys the perceived value among consumers of the bundled products. Amazon, for example, may be making money on the Kindle and not the e-books, but still profit in the long run.

The basic point here is that in the digital world it’s possible to imagine instances where it’s profitable for retailers to destroy the perceived consumer value of e-books and the associated hard copy titles.

Our society is best served by a robust e-book industry. As e-book prices declines, fewer and fewer authors are able to make a living expressing their ideas, whether they are political, socially insightful, or a form of entertainment.

With so much new competition emerging, and so many unknowns for the publishing industry itself, my strong bias is not to stretch interpretations of antitrust laws developed for a different era-and to allow the industry to do what it feels is best for its long-term survival. If the violations of the laws are clear-cut, then perhaps the Justice Department should seek to have the laws changed before beginning an enforcement action. If no violations are clear cut, then the Justice Department should have the wisdom to leave well enough alone. The worst possible outcome would be for the Department to attempt to extend the doctrines of the antitrust laws to cover the agency model, working from the mistaken belief that this would benefit our society.

Here are two takeaways:

First, the creation of information in our society has always been recognized as playing a central role in building a healthy democracy, with the attendant benefits of the best aspects of capitalism. This recognition is embodied in the first amendment. As we move to a digital era, there is increasingly less ability for information creators to profitably fund the creation of “expensive” information (i.e. books requiring extensive research and interviews, investigative journalism, and the like). Our democracy, and ultimately the operations of a robust, fair capitalist system — based on the best possible information — are poorer for this loss. To the extent that any of our existing laws inadvertently destroy the remaining infrastructure that profitably supports the creation of such information, they must be reexamined.

Second, the ability for retailers to make money on one product (such as the Kindle or the iPad), while cutting prices on digital products, is something new to our era. We need to stop and think about how the distribution of products that spread ideas may be affected by antitrust laws. We must ensure that our laws are not furthering the destruction of a robust marketplace for ideas.

Full Disclosure: I have published books with several publishing houses and worked as a paid consultant to several book and magazine companies.

All of the above is a unfortunate commentary on the state of values in America, and the expectations our citizenry has for its leadership. Sadly, we have come to expect the worst, rather than the best, in the people that lead our society. If we hope to regain the sense among our citizens that we are a great nation, and a force throughout the world for moral good, all of this is unacceptable.

But, despite the ongoing stream of disheartening news, today’s revelation is just over the top. As an optimistic cynic, I am shocked that Mitt Romney maintains a portfolio of investments headquartered in the Cayman Islands. As detailed by ABC News:

Although it is not apparent on his financial disclosure form, Mitt Romney has millions of dollars of his personal wealth in investment funds set up in the Cayman Islands, a notorious Caribbean tax haven.

There are a host of issues associated with these activities, and none of them are positive:

First, the Romney campaign contends that this is irrelevant. According to ABC News:

A spokesperson for the Romney campaign says Romney follows all tax laws and he would pay the same in taxes regardless of where the funds are based.

But, as experts quoted in the ABC News article noted:

Tax experts agree that Romney remains subject to American taxes. But they say the offshore accounts have provided him — and Bain — with other potential financial benefits, such as higher management fees and greater foreign interest, all at the expense of the U.S. Treasury. Rebecca J. Wilkins, a tax policy expert with Citizens for Tax Justice, said the federal government loses an estimated $100 billion a year because of tax havens.

Blum, the D.C. tax lawyer, said working through an offshore investment vehicle allows the investor to “avoid a whole series of small traps in the tax code that ordinary people would face if they paid tax on an onshore basis.”

Wilkins agreed, saying the “primary advantage to setting those funds up in an offshore jurisdiction like the Cayman Islands or Bermuda is it helps the investors avoid tax.”

FYI: I predict that, despite the statements of his campaign, we will ultimately find substantial tax savings for the Romney family through these tax havens.

Second, it is almost impossible for me to believe that any candidate running for President is foolish enough to think the American people don’t care.

There is nothing patriotic about parking money earned by “creating jobs” in offshore funds. It is fundamentally an unpatriotic act. You are knowingly taking your activities outside of the jurisdiction of the United States. How can Romney possibly defend this action?

Third, it seems clear that Romney has indeed been hiding something about his finances.

It is one thing to say I am a predatory–but honest–capitalist. And Romney’s year’s at Bain have sparked a healthy debate on the role of private equity firms in our nation’s economy.

It is another for a Presidential candidate, who has been working for years for this moment, to show such obvious disdain for the American system of Justice, that he removes his assets from it.

Moreover, there is the distinct feeling that the combination of Romney’s refusal to release his tax returns and the lack of disclosure of such accounts in his public filings (although within the law) indicate that Romney knows this is unpatriotic, reprehensible behavior and somehow believed he could be elected President without this coming to light.

Fourth, do we want a President that seems to believe he can successfully hide basic information like this from the American people. We have learned from the The Washington Post that at Bain Romeny’s word was not his bond. So, his honesty is already in question. Now, we are forced to wonder about his basic intelligence, and the intelligence of his advisers (if they knew about this).

In an earlier era, a revelation of this type would have forced Romney to resign from the race. The consequences in our age are, as yet, unknown. However, there is simply no acceptable reason  for a Presidential candidate to have his or her money managed in a jurisdiction purposely designed to avoid the laws and reporting requirements of the United States.

We are a better nation than this.

Last week, a number of important events occurred in Washington, including important recess appointments by President Obama. However, the most noteworthy event did not make front page news: the  Federal  Reserve’s  (apparently) unsolicited memo to the committees of Congress that oversee financial services warning of the dangers the current housing market poses for the economy.

This represents an extraordinary action and underscores both the seriousness of the continuing crisis and the absence of meaningful discussion of the problem in Washington. Bernanke’s memo reviewed federal actions to date and effectively concluded that they were unlikely to solve this national tragedy. The memo concluded, in part:

“The challenges faced by the U.S. housing market today reflect, in part…a persistent excess supply of homes on the market; and losses arising from an often costly and inefficient foreclosure process (and from problems in the current servicing model more generally)… Absent any policies to help bridge this gap, the adjustment process will take longer…pushing house prices lower and thereby prolonging the downward pressure on the wealth of current homeowners and the resultant drag on the economy at large.”

This memo is notable for several reasons. First, it’s important to remember that when the Fed speaks, it does so in sober, limited terms. So an unprompted Fed warning suggesting “a persistent excess of supply” and a “resultant drag on the economy” is comparable to the Secretary of Homeland Security holding a press conference to warn of the risk of an imminent national emergency. Second, an unprompted memo from Bernanke to the House means that he is so deeply worried he felt the need to speak out in as strong a voice as his position permits. Third, the Fed rarely speaks on issues unrelated to its direct activities. Indeed, The Wall Street Journal subsequently wrote that, “For an institution that jealously guards its independence, the Federal Reserve is wading into treacherous political waters.” This further underscores the severity of the risks the Fed foresees.

Finally, a further indicator of the depth of the Fed’s concerns is what may be an apparently unprecedented set of coordinated speeches by three top Fed officials. On Friday, the presidents of the New York and Boston Fed banks, and Betsy Duke, a Fed Governor, all gave speeches detailing the need for aggressive action to spur a housing recovery. For example, William Dudley, president of the New York Fed,  told a group that, “The ongoing weakness in housing has made it more difficult to achieve a vigorous economic recovery.”

There are a multitude of other indicators that our current treatment of the housing sector will at minimum prevent an economic recovery and at worst have disastrous consequences for the stability of the financial sector as well as the health of the middle class. (For the record, my analysis leans toward the latter of these two viewpoints.) These include the reportedly poor health of our financial institutions (zombie banks), the administration’s  seeming efforts to cover this fact up, and the inevitable failure of federal homeowner assistance programs that rely on the cooperation of financial institutions whose profit incentives are in the reverse direction.

Consumer spending represents 70 percent of the nation’s economy and is central to any economic recovery. To achieve sufficient  aggregate demand (i.e. total spending on goods and services), this will require  spending by middle-income individuals in addition to what we now call the 1%. The Fed report suggests that the housing crisis makes such a recovery unlikely.

The report  found that, in the aggregate, more than $7 trillion in home equity–more than half of the aggregate home equity that existed in early 2006—has now been lost, noting, “This substantial blow to household wealth has significantly weakened household spending and consumer confidence.” Moreover, “Middle-income households, as a group, have been particularly hard hit hit because home equity is a larger share of their wealth in the aggregate than it is for low-income households (who are less likely to be homeowners) or upper-income households (who own other forms of wealth such as financial assets and businesses).” These households have seen their home equity decline by an estimated 66 percent.

Moreover, the fear of a continuing loss of wealth (which is a cushion against job loss or other economic emergencies), the fear of job loss itself, the negative effects of underwater homes, lack of forbearance for unemployment (a point the Fed particularly emphasizes), and consumers struggling to meet mortgage payments in a far more difficult environment are all dragging the economy down.

There is also a far worse possibility. Today, an estimated  29 percent of all homes with mortgages are underwater. In addition, at least one respected analyst estimates that a total of 14 million homes will be foreclosed on from 2007 to the end of the crisis. This represents a hard-to-imagine one in every four mortgages. With foreclosures increasing, there is now such a looming imbalance of supply and demand that, as the Fed notes, further decreases in home prices are likely. Some believe home price reductions of another 20 percent are likely. This would, in all likelihood, have disastrous consequences on at least three fronts—and ripple effects that are impossible to predict.

First, many homeowners would be so far underwater that massive walkaways would be likely. The negative impact on consumer spending of such price declines would almost certainly lead to a vicious cycle of more job losses, leading to further walkaways by struggling consumers.

Second, the mortgage securities market would be in chaos. Nonperforming loans would lead to the forced recognition that bank capital (based on the value of mortgages in bank portfolios) is weak or insufficient.

Third, it is almost impossible to imagine foreclosures on the massive scale anticipated without dire social consequences or even some form of social unrest. As Peggy Noonan has observed, the real meaning of Occupy Wall Street is that this is just the  beginning of the protests we are likely to see. “OWS is an expression of American discontent, and others will follow,” she predicts. Protests and social unrest are particularly likely if people feel they are unfairly losing their homes to support irresponsible, law- breaking institutions that have successfully disregarded the fundamental rules of capitalism and good citizenship. Mechanisms to avoid this possibility are one of the central issues I address in my

forthcoming book, Making Capitalism Work for the 99%: A Manifesto.

What is shocking is the almost total lack of attention the administration has paid to suffering homeowners. It’s hard for me (and apparently Chairman Bernanke) to understand how the administration can possibly hope to revitalize the economy without seriously addressing the overhang of consumer housing debt. Moreover, the failure to address the risk this poses for a broader economic catastrophe borders on the inexcusable.

If President Obama is serious about saving the middle class and  reducing income inequality, the administration needs to be far more aggressive in developing policies to keep homeowners as homeowners. As I have written before, this was one of FDR’s c entral go als in the New Deal. Detailed proposals for addressing this extraordinary risk  do exist. However, they will require a determined effort. There are solutions, but they are not simple.

What is most important right now is that we recognize we are in a lifeboat that will not reach land. We need to focus on implementing a meaningful solution to the problem. A clock is ticking and Washington needs to acknowledge that a witching hour is approaching.

This article originally appeared as part of the Restoring Capitalism series of the New Deal 2.0 blog, a project of the Roosevelt Institute.

At the time, I referenced the SEC case against Citigroup and criticized the relatively small fine the SEC had imposed, suggesting it was evidence of a broader problem related to meaningful enforcement of the laws by the agency. As background, SEC settlements must be ratified by the court, and a central aspect of these SEC settlements is that defendants “neither admit nor deny the allegations.” Rarely does the court fail to endorse an agreement proposed by the SEC, since it’s the prosecuting party.

Subsequently, the proposed Citigroup agreement has received considerable attention, as U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff rejected the settlement, calling it “neither reasonable, nor fair, nor adequate, nor in the public interest.” He both criticized the typical SEC “neither admit nor deny” form of settlement and called the SEC negotiated fine “pocket change” for Citigroup. Today, The Wall Street Journal indicated that the SEC enforcement division is expected to recommend to SEC commissioners that the Judge’s decision be appealed.

These recent events beg a deeper look at the system of SEC enforcement. Why has the SEC apparently pursued such minimal settlements? The answers are surprising in that they reflect a wide discrepancy of views.

I found three very different explanations. There is probably some truth in each of them. But they all indicate that we have a broken system that must be fixed so that capitalism can operate properly.

First, the SEC enforcement division is underfunded and therefore lacks the resources to pursue a large number of complex trials. Critics say this reflects a deliberate effort by Congress, influenced by large financial institutions, to prevent punishment for malfeasance. This suggests yet another example of how our largest financial institutions are preventing actual capitalism from functioning, often in ways that are not obvious.

Second, without the no admission of guilt clause, defendants would open themselves up to a stream of well-funded plaintiff actions based on admitted guilt and even risk bankruptcy. In essence, the proponents of this explanation suggest SEC fines are considered a cost of doing business, but if injured customers have an adequate chance of redress then the punishment will more closely relate to the injuries caused by the illegal actions involved and this worries the banks. Judge Rakoff’s opinion sharply criticized the settlement in this regard, indicating it “depriv[ed] the pubic of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public importance.”

Third, it can be explained by the revolving door, where former SEC enforcement officials are “going to work for the very same firms they used to police.” Top SEC enforcement officials represent some the clearest examples of people who move out of government to high paying jobs in the private sector. This has a chilling effect on the efficacy of SEC efforts related to the largest, most powerful institutions. Clearly, we need to find a fair system that will both attract talent to the SEC but prevent this phenomenon.

There are several implications to these different explanations for what is clearly a broken system. Without the deterrent effect of the credible threat of law enforcement, the financial services industry will continue its malfeasance. The additional deterrent effect of successful private lawsuits based on a pre-existing admission of guilt is lost when the SEC uses the no admission of guilt standard. This raises a central question: Is the SEC’s role in our society to punish and deter malfeasance, or is it to help victims more easily recover losses resulting from misconduct? If it is the latter, then finding the actual truth of guilt or innocence would serve a strong societal interest.

Additionally, the knowledge that the SEC always settles suits will inevitably start to enter into the thinking of potential bad actors. Here again the deterrent effect is minimized. It becomes easy to imagine bad actors discussing an issue and saying, “What’s the worst that could happen? We will settle with the SEC for far less than we will make on this deal and the details will never become public.” Meanwhile, malfeasance by the financial sector has caused millions of people to suffer.

Clear solutions to these problems exist. The Obama administration must insist on far more extensive funding for SEC enforcement. Then we need to remember the famous words of Justice Brandeis, who said, “We can have democracy in this country, or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both.” Perhaps, as recently discussed by The New York Times, it’s time to reconsider the maximum size and concentration of power in our financial institutions, which seem to consistently interfere with the fair operation of capitalism.

This post originally appeared as part of the New Deal 2.0 project of the Roosevelt Institute.